This paper applies survival analysis to individual trading data from a discount brokerage firm, and documents significant individual-level repurchase bias, investors' tendency to disproportionately repurchase more previously sold winners than losers.
Introduction
Conventional portfolio choice theories hinge upon the assumption that individual investors form subjective beliefs about all future states, and maximize expected utility. Given the constraints they face and the complexity of the financial market, this task becomes so demanding that some form of learning is essential, regarding parameter values, private signal quality, personal skills, etc.
1 However, learning from experience can be suboptimal, because individual investors may overweight own experience relative to other information in a changing environment. This paper focuses on investors heterogeneous responses to own experience in common stock trading, and finds that their sophistication and experience help them but cannot stop them from losing by using naïve reinforcement strategies.
This work is partially motivated by an interest in understanding individual investor learning. The effect of experiential learning can manifest in the improvement of skills as experience accumulates. The finance literature documented that more experience can induce better trading performance (Nicolosi, Peng and Zhu, 2009 ) and reduce behavioral biases (Dhar and Zhu, 2006) . To quantify experience, these studies use proxies such as the length of trading experience and the number of trades executed. What was missing in these measures is that good and bad experience may have differential impacts on behavior. For example, reinforcement learning predicts good experience with an action increases the probability of the action being retaken while bad experience decreases it, a robust finding in psychology and economics (see e.g. Thorndike, 1898; Erev and Roth, 1998; Charness and Levin, 2005) . If skill, and/or private signal quality, is relatively constant, then investors with bad performance should exit (Seru, Shumway and Stoffman, 2010) . Meanwhile, good experience can lead to overconfidence (Gervais and Odean, 2001) , emergence and disappearance of investment styles (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) and preferences towards certain assets, albeit unjustifiable given the nonstationarity of financial markets. Empirical evidence in finance suggests that more good experience with IPO auctions (Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008) , 401(k) portfolios (Choi et al., 2009 ) and common stocks (Strahilevitz, Odean and Barber, 2011, henceforth S2011) increases investors' subsequent demand for them.
Particularly in stock investments, S2011 document that investors used a reinforcement stragegy, repurchasing more stocks previously sold for gains than stocks sold for losses, which cannot be readily rationalized by investors' actual or perceived skill. This repurchase bias, on the one hand, is hard to justify on average given the the inherent randomness of the market. If skills improved with experience, investors should ultimately abandon the reinforcement strategy that is loss-inducing. In the meantime, it is also plausible that some investors carefully selected stocks and could sustain positive returns from repurchasing.
S2011's analysis could not differentiate these cases. This paper addresses the issue by further analyzing the repurchase effect at the individual level, relating to investors' sophistication and experience, and comparing their repurchasing performances.
In the discount brokerage firm data in S2011, although significant repurchase bias was identified on average, only a small proportion of investors did repurchase: among the 19,059
households for whom the measure of repurchase bias can be calculated, 2,466 significantly repurchased more prior winners than losers and only 433 did the opposite at the 95% level. I use trading frequency, portfolio size, number of stocks in portfolio to proxy investor sophistication, and length of account tenure and number of trades executed to proxy experience.
In the survival analysis with Weibull error distribution function, investors' sophistication and experience, especially trading frequency, significantly reduced the repurchase bias, but in an asymmetric way. Interestingly, for the most frequent investors, the tendency to avoid prior losers was almost completely eliminated, but they were still about twice more likely to repurchase prior winners. I further explore their reasons for doing so and find limited attention and risk adjusted returns could not explain the asymmetry. Thus, this suggests that naïve reinforcement learning could be a reason why investors lose from frequent trading.
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Another motivation comes from the lack of empirical studies on individual buying decisions. Recently using individual-level trading data, some studies examine investors performance, trading intensity, portfolio composition, etc. (see e.g. Odean, 2000, 2001; Seru, Shumway and Stoffman, 2010) , while others mostly investigate selling decisions. The focus on selling decisions is possibly because (1) the choice set of a selling decision can be somewhat unambiguously determined, 3 and (2) there is the interest in studying the disposition effect, which is fundamentally about selling (see e.g. Odean, 1998; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006) . Only a few individual-level empirical studies investigate buying decisions. Some compare the characteristics of stocks bought versus sold, evading the issue of an unclear choice set at the time of a purchase (see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2008) . S2011 and the present paper, study a special type of buying decision, i.e. repurchasing, which has a clear choice set that encompasses all stocks previously sold.
Data and Methodology

Data
The data used in this study contain trading records, position statements and demographic information of 78,000 households that had active accounts in a large US discount brokerage firm between January 1991 and December 1996. This paper investigates the repurchase effect at the individual level, whereas the concept of an individual corresponds to a household in the dataset. Among the 78,000 households, 66,465 had common stock positions for at least one month, while on average 60 percent of their market value were invested in common stocks. For tax and other reasons, some households had more than one account, and each household had an average of roughly two accounts. The data also contain considerable amount of the demographic information.
Various studies have demonstrated the effects of gender, income, occupation, etc. on trading behavior (see e.g. Dhar and Zhu, 2006 ).
Methodology
As the first step to individual analysis of the repurchase bias, I measure the tendency of each investor repurchasing stocks previously sold for gain (loss). To quantify this tendency, I
follow S2011 in calculating the proportion of stocks repurchased out of the total opportunities to repurchase stocks previously sold for gain (loss), with the resulting measures called P W R (P LR). S2011 did this across all investors, while I generate these measures for each individual whenever the data permit. Two issues are noteworthy here. For one, when counting the number of opportunities to repurchase, the analysis restricts attention to sales on which return can be calculated, discarding instances where purchases were made before the start of the records, and thus the resulting number of opportunities to repurchase is potentially smaller than the actual number. But this should not systematically bias the measures of interest here. The other issue is that I focus on repurchases made within a year so that all stocks sold would have the same one-year window of repurchasing opportunities.
Specifically, to calculate P W R (P LR), on each day when an investor buys a stock, I count the number of sales at gain (loss) within the previous year whose return can be calculated, then aggregate across all trading days to get her total number of opportunities to repurchase stocks sold for gain (loss); P W R (P LR) is the total number of repurchases of stocks previously sold for gain (loss) divided by the total number of opportunities to do so.
Equations (1) with logit regression, is that it explicitly models the time to an event, such as death, failure, collapse of financial institutions, etc. To study the disposition effect, the event of interest is the stock's sale. S2011 and the present paper both study repurchasing decisions, with each stock entering the data when it was sold, the start date being the sales date, and the event of interest being the repurchase.
The survival analysis in S2011 is the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) , a nonparametric survival model, assuming when all the covariates are zero, the baseline hazard rate, i.e. the baseline repurchase rate, is the same on each day subsequent to the sale. This assumption seems too restrictive, because holding all covariates constant, the probability of 
where t is time, X are the covariates, and p the Weibull parameter for the shape of the baseline hazard function. The baseline hazard rate is h 0 (t) = pt p−1 . An intercept β 0 is estimated, which serves as a scaler for the baseline hazard function h 0 (t) exp(β 0 ). If the estimated p is 1, it implies constant baseline hazard rate over time, so the model reduces to the proportional hazard model with exponential error distribution. The model will be estimated using the maximum likelihood method, with standard errors clustered by households to account for correlation of observations within households. The marginal effect of each covariate will be a hazard ratio, i.e. the effect on repurchase rates per unit change of the covariate relative to the baseline ceteris paribus.
Results
Investor Sophistication and Experience
A closer examination of the data reveals that among the 66,465 households that held common stocks, 60,241 had at least one trading record; 5,355 had no sales, i.e. no repurchase opportunity, for whom we cannot calculate P W R or P LR. Seasholes (2005), I use monthly averages because (1) all accounts were opened on or after the start of their sample, which is not the case here, and (2) their had a two-year sample, which is relatively short compared to six years here, and within a longer time horizon, investors' skills may improve. Trading frequency was used as a measure of sophistication in Dhar and Zhu (2006) . Another fixed covariate is the length of an investors trading experience, measured in years of account tenure (T enure). Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these measures for the whole and restricted samples. Compared to the whole sample, the restricted sample households had higher trading frequency and were more diversified, but managing smaller portfolios.
(Insert Table 1 Figure 1 shows the histogram of P W R− P LR across individuals, excluding those who never repurchased. The majority of these households had P W R − P LR clustered around zero, but clearly the mass of the distribution lies above zero, suggesting a positive repurchase bias. I calculate standard error of the measures as in equation (5), following Odean (1998).
S2011 report the statistics of P W R and P LR for the aggregate data, and find their difference significantly positive using a standard error of P W R − P LR calculated by a conservative measure, replacing the denominators in equation (5) with the number of repurchases of prior winners and losers. Although the conservative measure intends to alleviate the problem caused by violation of the independence assumption, using it requires nonzero repurchases, which is quite restrictive at the individual level. The test statistics indicate that for 2,466
households, the null hypothesis that P W R−P LR <= 0 can be rejected at the 5% significance level; and the opposite is true for only 433 households.
# of opportunities to repurchase prior winners
# of opportunities to repurchase prior losers
7 Here I treat taxable and tax-exempt accounts together because S2011 showed that they suffered from similar repurchase bias.
8 The spike immediately to the right of zero is not caused by households who had P W R − P LR = 0 sorted into that bin. There were only 72 such households and the histogram does not change much after removing them.
Survival analysis 3.3.1 The Baseline
This section uses survival analysis to first demonstrate the existence of a disproportionately larger propensity to repurchase stocks that brought previous gains than those that incurred losses. Then the measures of individual investor sophistication and experience will be added to the baseline model. The sample of this analysis encompasses all sales from January 1991 to December 1995 for which return can be calculated, whereas the event of interest occurs whenever a stock is repurchased within a year following its sale. Sales made after 1995 are dropped because they do not have at least one-year window for repurchases. There were a total of 62,821 repurchases (49,576 for prior winners and 13,245 for prior losers), out of 2,127,326 opportunities to repurchase (1,304,157 for prior winners and 823,169 for prior losers). As in S2011, the regressions below control for some usual factors that influence buying decisions, including the inverse holding period (InvHoldP ) and log of relative trading volume (LogRelV ol). The holding period is the number of days a stock was held before its sale; and relative trading volume is the volume of all trades of a stock measured in dollars in the previous year divided by the total volume of all trades of all stocks measured in dollars in the same year. These may trigger repurchases: a stock held longer before the previous sale could be a stock that the investor knew more about or felt more emotionally attached; a stock with higher relative trading volume could catch more attention.
The survival models also control for returns subsequent to sale: Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that individual investors are net sellers of stocks with high past returns at least up to a week; Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) find individuals buy (sell) after price decreases (increases) in the previous month; S2011 demonstrate a disproportionate tendency to repurchase more stocks that declined in value after previous sale than those that increased in value, which they proposed to explain using counterfactual learning.
9 Though this is not the focus of the present paper, I control for the performance of a stock subsequent to its sale using a set of performance measures. From the CRSP daily stock file, I calculate the 5, 10, 15, 21, 42-day and 63 trading day returns of each stock in excess of market return after the sales date, i.e. the stock return minus the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return within each time range.
To justify the use of the Weibull error distribution instead of other parametric or nonparametric specifications in the survival model, Figure 2 plots the number of repurchases against the number of days between the sale and the repurchase. It clearly shows that as time elapsed, fewer stocks were repurchased, suggesting that the probability of repurchase declined monotonically over time. The majority of the repurchases were made within a short period after the original sale: 11.92% repurchases were made within five days after the sale, and only 15.73% were made more than a year later.
(Insert Figure 2 approximately here.) Table 2a and 2b report results separately for the survival models that test effects of positive and negative previous sales returns. The first regressions in these tables report the effect of the main explanatory variable, the dummy variable P os (N eg) which is equal to 1 when the previous sales return was positive (negative). This is similar to Feng and Seasholes (2005) in studying the disposition effect, but different from S2011, who generated a set of dummy variables for different brackets of sales returns with the purpose of capturing the complete locus of return effects. I use the positive and negative sales return dummies for the convenience of studying their interaction with investor characteristics. The results are consistent with S2011, showing that a positive sales return increased the likelihood of the stock's subsequent repurchase, and a negative return decreased it. The hazard ratio of approximately 1.16 on P os indicates that, ceteris paribus, stocks previously sold at gain were 16% more likely to be repurchased later compared to stocks sold at negative or zero return. Similarly, stocks previously sold at loss were almost 40% less likely to be repurchased later. The set of control variables are included in all regressions, but their hazard ratios not reported. They consistently exert significant effect on repurchases. The return measures subsequent to sales reveal their inverse relationship with repurchases. The value of parameter p is significantly smaller than one, indicating that holding all covariates at zero, the baseline hazard rate, i.e. the chance of repurchase, decreased monotonically over time.
(Insert Table 2a and 2b approximately here.)
The Effects of Fixed Covariates
Now I add the fixed covariates (AvgF req, AvgSize, AvgN um and T enure) to the survival analysis. But note that they are not added as continuous variables, which may complicate interpretation of the results. For each fixed covariate, I generate 3 dummy variables (F 2, F 3, F 4) respectively for values falling into the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartile across all observations of the variable, and 0 otherwise. The 1st quartile is omitted to avoid multicollinearity.
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The baseline hazard rate of each regression is obtained when all covariates are set to zero, and that specifically corresponds to each fixed covariate included in that regression falling in its first quartile. The product of the sales return dummy and the quartile dummies can reveal if investor sophistication/experience influenced the propensity to repurchase previous winners and losers.
The hazard ratio estimates for the quartile dummies alone show the tendency to repurchase stocks sold, regardless of it being a previous winner or loser. For example, the hazard ratios for the quartile dummies of AvgF req are all significant at 1% level and and they reveal that households in higher quartiles of trading frequency were at least three times more likely to repurchase stocks previously sold than households in the first quartile. The main interest of this analysis lies in the hazard ratios associated with the interaction variables. The results
show that frequent traders repurchased more, and they were less likely to repurchase prior winners but more likely to repurchase prior losers, compared with less frequent traders. For 10 Note that the quartile dummies for AvgF req are not exactly defined according to the quartiles, because as shown in Table 1 , the 1st quartile for average trading frequency does not differ a lot from the 2nd quartile. Therefore, the dummies for AvgF req are for average trading frequencies between 1 and 2, between 2 and 3, and above 3 respectively, with the upper bound inclusive in each range.
example, in Table 2a regression (2), the hazard ratio for P os is 6.6946, and that for P os×F 2 is 0.5688, which means investors in the first quartile of trading frequency were 6.6946 times more likely to repurchase prior winners than other stocks sold; investors in the second quartile were only 6.6946 × 0.5688 = 3.8079 times more likely; investors in the fourth quartile were only 6.6946 × 0.3801 = 2.5446 times more likely. On the other hand, investors in the first quartile of trading frequency were about 53% less likely to repurchase a prior loser than if the stock yielded positive or zero return; the number is 65.89%, 77.82% and 89.63% for the second, third and fourth quartiles, respectively.
Investors managing larger portfolios repurchased more, and had smaller tendency to avoid prior losers; investors who had more stocks in portfolios had smaller tendency to repurchase prior winners; the length of trading experience has weakly signifiant effect on reducing the tendency to avoid prior losers. Together, the results point to the same direction for the influence of investor sophistication and experience on repurchase decisions, in that investors who were more sophisticated or had longer experience tended to repurchase more prior losers and fewer prior winners, leading to a smaller repurchase bias. Trading frequency exerted the largest effect among the variables tested. In a cross-sectional comparison, simply longer trading experience had little effect, which is consistent with Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2010) , who found that extra trades, but not extra length of experience, alleviated behavioral biases such as the disposition effect.
It is understandable that more frequent investors repurchased more, if the stocks they originally purchased were selected carefully, and their repurchases brought superior performances. But this does not justify any bias towards prior winners. The bias towards buying more prior winners is reduced at much slower rate than the bias towards avoiding prior losers.
This asymmetry can possibly be rationalized if winners repurchased on average outperform losers repurchased, even for sophisticated traders. In what follows, I will investigate the performance of winners and losers repurchased for different groups of investors, and whether the bias can be eliminated by investor sophistication and experience. i.e. they had larger propensity to repurchase previously sold stocks in general, and smaller repurchase bias than their less experienced counterparts.
Up to this point, my analysis investigated the effect of each sophistication/experience measure separately, so it is still unclear whether the most sophisticated/experienced investors could completely get rid of the repurchase bias. I try to address this question by examining the combined effects of sophistication and experience on responses to previously sold winners and losers. The results for the best specification of such a model are reported in Table 3 . This model includes the fixed measure of individual trading frequency, and the time-dependent measure of the length of trading experience. Number of trades executed is not included because it is correlated with trading frequency; portfolio size and number of stocks do not have additional explanatory power when trading frequency is controlled for.
11 First of all, the coefficients on the quartile dummies alone reaffirms that more frequent investors repurchased more. As to the interaction effects, apparently the most robust effect still comes from average trading frequency alleviating the bias in both domains of gains and losses, whereas the timevarying experience measure had some effect in reducing the tendency of avoiding prior losers.
Controlling for trading frequency, the length of experience had no effect on repurchasing propensity on prior winners, which suggests that experience quantity is insufficient to help 11 Other specifications are tried but fail to generate an improvement based on those shown in the table.
them completely avoid the naïve reinforcement strategy.
(Insert Table ? ? approximately here.)
Individual investors' sophistication and experience have been shown to diminish behavioral biases (see e.g. List, 2003; Feng and Seasholes, 2005) . Chiang et al. (2011) show that more sophisticated investors were less prone to the reinforcement learning bias in a cross-sectional comparison in the Taiwanese IPO market, but investors' auction selection ability and performance deteriorated with experience due to naïve reinforcement learning.
To demonstrate the effects here visually, Figure 3 The drop in naïve reinforcement learning can be caused by the larger sample of personal direct experience which helped them debias. In addition to direct experience, even inactive investors could learn from the indirect experience of others. The additional effect from the length of experience in reducing the tendency to avoid prior losers could be due to this observational learning. It is worth noting that debiasing might be more difficult in common stock trading, because in the IPO market, each new IPO auction belongs to a different company, which makes it easier to realize that past and future performances are not necessarily correlated, but this is not the case here, in that stocks previously sold are always in the choice set when investors make subsequent buying decisions. Thus, this might be a reason why the sophistication and experience variables combined fail to completely eliminate the bias given the abundant opportunities to learn in the stock market.
Although sophistication and experience together failed to completely eliminate the propensity to repurchase previously sold winners, they almost completely eliminate the propensity to avoid previously sold losers. That is, one component of naïve reinforcement learning, which is to repeat actions that brought pleasant experience, was more stubborn than the component of avoiding those that brought unpleasant experience.
12 This asymmetry in the gain versus loss domain is comparable to Feng and Seasholes (2005) who find an asymmetric effect where sophistication and experience together eliminated the tendency to hold losers but only dampened the tendency to sell winners, reducing the disposition effect.
They try to use mental accounting to explain this but do not find supporting evidence.
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Mental accounting suggests that losses should be combined and gains should be treated separately, but this is with regard to how investors treat stocks in their portfolio when they try to close a mental account, whilst repurchasing opens new mental accounts. So the same logic does not apply well to repurchasing decisions. This asymmetry can be rationalized if winners repurchased on average performed better than losers repurchased, especially for high frequency traders. To test this hypothesis, the performances of stocks repurchased by traders of different trading frequency are presented in the following section.
Why and What did Investors Repurchase?
The foregoing analyses have demonstrated that more sophisticated investors, especially those with higher trading frequency, compared with their less sophisticated counterparts, 12 Other sophistication and experience measures were tried, but the sensitivity to previous gains cannot be reduced to below 2.
13 I propose that simple reinforcement learning might explain their results but not mine, although careful evaluations of this hypothesis is needed.
repurchased fewer prior winners but more prior losers, although this does not completely eliminate their tendency of naïve reinforcement learning. Up to this point, it is still unclear why they repurchased, and whether there is any performance-related motivation that triggered their repurchase pattern. This section will address these questions.
The first possibility is that individual investors, including sophisticated ones, were constrained by their limited attentional budget, so that they monitored stocks previously sold because it is harder to search for new stocks than to focus attention on a particular subset of stocks, especially those prior winners.
14 The trading accounts in my sample belonged to individual investors, who were supposed to have limited attention issue and more prone to behavioral biases than institutional investors (see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2008) . Suppose repurchases were caused by attention constraints, then in order to purchase a stock never owned before investors should require the stock to be more attention-catching than a repurchased stock. The above-documented asymmetry could possibly emerge if attention is an issue also for frequent traders. Table 4 presents a comparison of the attention-catching characteristics of previously unowned stocks purchased, and stocks repurchased that brought positive, negative or zero return on previous sale, summarized separately for investors in the top and bottom half of trading frequency distribution. Three categories of stock characteristics are compared.
Firstly, market variables that may attract attention are compared in the upper panel of Table 4 : AbV ol, abnormal volume, is the number of standard deviations from the current trading volume to the average trading volume of the stock within the previous year; HistH and HistL are indicators of the prior day price being a new historical high or new historical low in the past month, so averages of these variables represent the proportion of cases where the stock bought had a new historical high or low price; V olatility, measured by average squared returns during the previous week, is known to drive disagreements among investors and to be positively correlated with trading volume (Karpoff, 1987) .
If investors faced attentional constraints, they should be more willing to purchase a stock previously sold, even with zero return, than a stock never owned before; and due to naïve reinforcement learning, they should have a bias towards previously sold winners. Therefore, within each trading frequency category, the attention-grabbing factors should be higher for stocks never owned than previously sold stocks, and the stocks previously sold with positive returns should be the least attention-catching; on the other hand, the differences should be less salient for more frequent traders. The predicted patterns manifested clearly in abnormal trading volumes. Moreover, investors chose to purchase never-owned stocks that were more likely to have historical high prices but less likely to have historical low prices than repurchased stocks. 15 The volatility measures did not generate much difference.
Comparing between the two categories of investors, many attention-grabbing factors were lower for infrequent traders than for frequent traders when they repurchased.
The second comparison, reported in the middle panel of Table 4 , is about relative performance before the (re)purchase, measured by the return to the stock in excess of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return within the 5, 15, 21, 63 or 126 trading days. Recent good performance should also be attention-catching and should attract momentum traders to buy the stock. In general the frequent traders consistently chose better past performers than the infrequent traders in all horizons tested in both repurchases and new purchases.
Both categories of investors apparently required significantly better prior performance before they bought new stocks or repurchased stocks previously sold with zero return than when they made repurchases of prior winners or losers, which was especially prominent within short horizons up to 21 trading days before the purchase. Additionally, the less frequent traders were contrarian buyers of previously sold stocks. The more frequent traders seemed to be short run (less than a month) contrarian traders but momentum in the medium run when repurchasing prior losers, which should be a profitable strategy suggested by the literature on momentum and contrarian strategies (Jegadeesh, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993 ). However, they were doing the opposite when repurchasing prior winners. Together with the results from the upper panel, these suggest that limited attention seemed to be an issue for these individual investors, and it was more severe for infrequent traders; frequent traders were more careful in selecting previous losers to repurchase, but not in repurchasing prior winners.
And lastly, the lower panel of Table 4 compares relative performances in the 5, 15, 21, 63 or 126 trading days after the (re)purchase. If investors (re)purchased due to reasons such as private information or superior stock-selection skills, then the stocks they (re)purchased should have good performance; and because the frequent traders still had a large propensity to repurchase prior winners, we would expect they made positive return from doing so. However, the results suggest that on average both categories of investors were losing from their (re)purchases, indicating poor stock-picking abilities. Overall, these investors could have been better off purchasing stocks never owned before than repurchasing. The previously sold winners underperformed previously sold losers in almost (but not) all horizons. The previously losers repurchased by frequent traders outperformed those repurchased by infrequent traders. These can potentially justify why frequent traders repurchased more losers, but not why they could not resist repurchasing prior winners, leaving naïve reinforcement learning a plausible explanation.
(Insert Table 4 approximately here.)
To further explore the performance of stocks repurchased and whether frequent traders were better at selecting stocks to repurchase, next I test the risk-adjusted returns of the repurchased stocks. I construct portfolios that use 1 dollar to purchase the previous winners/losers investors repurchased and hold each position for one calendar year, and calculate the portfolio risk-adjusted returns using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The fourfactor model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) is also estimated to take into account the effects of investment styles on returns, such as small or large market capitalization, value or growth stock and price momentum. These portfolios are constructed for all investors, those in the top quartile and those in the bottom quartile of trading frequencies respectively.
Equation (6) is the four-factor model to be estimated,
where R p t is the return to the constructed portfolio; R f t is the one-month treasury bill rate; R m t is the return to the value-weighted market portfolio; SM B t is the average return on the three small-cap portfolios minus the average return on the three big-cap portfolios;
HM L t is the average return on the two value stock portfolios minus the average return on the two growth stock portfolios; and U M D t is the average return on the recent winner portfolio minus the return on the recent loser portfolio. The estimation results are reported in Table 5 .
(Insert Table 5 approximately here.)
Across all investors in general, the winners repurchased underperformed the market by 0.58% per day while the losers repurchased outperformed by 0.27% and these cannot be explained by investment styles, so the investors would be better off repurchasing more previously sold losers. For the infrequent traders, neither the CAPM nor the four-factor model could explain the performance of the stocks they repurchased: the losers they repurchased did not generate significant abnormal return, but the winners they repurchased were much worse, underperforming by 0.74% per day. For the frequent traders, it did seem that they were more careful in picking which stocks to repurchase, generating higher return in both portfolios of repurchased winners and losers than the whole sample, but their repurchased winners still considerably underperformed, which cannot rationalize their propensity to repurchase prior losers. In choosing the losers to repurchase, they were picking some recently underperforming low-beta small value stocks. But the four factors cannot explain the abnormal return to their prior losers portfolio: the intercept terms were the same as in the CAPM, significantly positive, suggesting that they probably exhibited some skills when choosing which losers to repurchase.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of individual investors' repurchasing decisions, a special form of buying decisions for which the choice set is determined at the time the decisions are made. Consistent with previous findings at the aggregate level, at the individual level, there was a significant bias towards repurchasing more stocks previously sold at gain than those sold at loss, as if they were following the reinforcement learning strategy, repeating the action that brought pleasant experience while avoiding those that brought unpleasant experience.
Additionally, this paper addresses the issue of investor learning, by investigating the relationship between investors sophistication/experience and the repurchase bias. Trading frequency or the number of trades executed, but not the length of trading experience, helped investors reduce the repurchase bias. However, sophistication and experience had an asymmetric effect: even for the most frequent and experienced traders, although the tendency to avoid prior losers was almost entirely eliminated, they were still about twice more likely to repurchase prior winners.
By further investigating the characteristics of stocks (re)purchased by investors with different trading frequencies, I find that limited attention was an issue for them, especially the infrequent traders, that they were not simply chasing past returns but using counterfactuals when repurchasing, and that although the most frequent traders had some skills in choose prior losers to repurchase, the risk-adjusted returns could not justify their repurchase of prior winners. None of these could explain the asymmetry mentioned above, leaving reinforcement learning motives still a plausible explanation. So by trading frequently, individual investors lose from naïve reinforcement learning by repurchasing previously sold winners, which can be a potential reason for the bad performance documented for frequent traders.
The asymmetry in the effect of sophistication/experience calls for further research efforts.
In the meantime, a test of reinforcement learning is a test of the joint hypothesis regarding the choice of the source of reinforcement and the learning pattern. Here we assume in-vestors received reinforcements from absolute gains and losses, while other potential sources of reinforcements can be validated. This table reports the summary statistics of investors sophistication and experience measures for the whole sample of 60,241 households and the restricted sample of 31,350 households, respectively. AvgF req is the average trading frequency, AvgSize is the average size of endof-month portfolios in thousands of dollars; AvgN um is the average number of stocks in end-of-month portfolios; T enure is the length of household trading experience in years from first account opening to December 1996. The table also reports summary statistics of P W R, P LR and P W R − P LR. This table reports the summary statistics of investors' sophistication and experience  measures for the whole sample of 60,241 households and the restricted sample of 31,350 households, respectively. AvgFreq is the average trading frequency, Avgsize is the average size of end-of-month portfolios in thousands of dollars; AvgNum is the average number of stocks in end-of-month portfolios; Tenure is the length of household trading experience in years from first account opening to December 1996. The This table reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the characteristics of stocks purchased with positive, negative or zero return from prior sales and those that were never owned before, for investors in the least (F req = 1, 2) and most (F req = 3, 4) average trading frequencies. The characteristics include the following: V olatility is the squared return of the previous trading day; HistH and HistL are indicators of whether the price was a new historical high or historical low; AbV ol is the difference between the volume of a stock and the previous-year average measured in standard deviations. The ExRet variables are the excess returns of the stock compared to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio in the 5, 15, 21, 63 and 126 days before and after the purchase.
Kaustia
SUMMARY STATISTICS (TABLE1)
CHARACTERISTICS OF STOCKS PURCHASED AND REPURCHASED (ATTENTION) This table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the characteristics of stocks purchased with positive prior, negative or zero return from prior sales and those that were never owned before, for investors in the top (Freq=1, 2) and bottom (Freq=3, 4) half of average trading frequency distribution separately. The characteristics include the following: Volatility is the squared return of the previous trading day; HistH and HistL are indicators of whether the price was a new historical high or historical low; AbVol is the abnormal trading volume. The ExRet variables are the excess returns of the stock compared to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio in the 5, 15, 21, 63 and 126 days before and after the purchase. This table contains the estimation results of the CAPM and Four-Factor Model for portfolios constructed using 1 dollar to purchase each stock repurchased, prior winners and losers respectively, and hold the position for one year. Regressions (1) to (4) are for all investors, (5) to (8) for the investors in the first quartile of average trading frequency, (9) to (12) for the investors in the fourth quartile of average trading frequency. R m t is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio return; R f t is the one-month T-bill rate; SM B t is the average return on the small cap portfolio minus the average return on the big cap portfolio; HM L t is the average return on the value stock portfolio minus the average return on the growth portfolio; U M D t is the average return on the recent winner portfolio minus the average return on the recent loser portfolio. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10)
CAPM AND FOUR-FACTOR MODEL ESTIMATIONS FOR PORTFOLIOS OF REPURCHASED STOCKS (PORTFOLIO)
This table contains the estimation results of the CAPM and Four-Factor Model for portfolios constructed using $1 to purchase each stock repurchased, prior winners and losers respectively, and hold the position for one year. Regressions (1) to (4) are for all investors, (5) to (8) for the investors in the first quartile of average trading frequency, (9) to (12) for the investors in the fourth quartile of average trading frequency. R t m is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio return; R t f is the one-month T-bill rate; SMB t is the average return on the small cap portfolio minus the average return on the big cap portfolio; HML t is the average return on the value stock portfolio minus the average return on the growth portfolio; UMD t is the average return on the recent winner portfolio minus the average return on the recent loser portfolio. This figure plots the histogram of P W R − P LR of the 19,059 households within the sample for whom the difference between P W R and P LR can be calculated. This difference ranges from -1 to 1, with the width of each bin being 0.1 in the histogram.
FIGURE 2 DAYS TO REPURCHASES
Note: This figure is a scatter plot of the number of repurchases against the number of days till repurchase. The repurchases are grouped according to the number of days elapsed between the original sale and the repurchase. Then the number of repurchases is counted for each group. The number of days ranges from 0 to 365 with 1-day increments. Therefore, only repurchases made within a year subsequent to the sale are included. 
